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The foundation of the 13,er to 'cqzire

legal rights

and i-,Lose legal obligations by contract lies in the necessities of soci il and business relations; and the development

of the lay: of contracts has kert pace with the -rogress of
the society in v.xhich it

huas been applied.

As the conditions

of society have changed and business interests have assumed
lar-er pvomortions, two tendencies in the develorment of the
law are noticeable: first, a tendency to enl--gc the scope
of legal comrentency as regarfs the acquisition of contractual rights;

second, a tendency to enforce

;hose rights by

more direct and =ore afdequate romc.ies.
These tendencies have manifested themselves in
various ways.
UnIer t-e Roman

Law, the ac

rights Ieyended entirely Xpon personal

7tuislton

f c.ntractual

-activity.

Uo one
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could enforce a contract to which 'ie was not directly a party.
The fundamental principle of their jurisprudence was that each
person must act for himself, in his own name, and in his own
interests.

The nearest arT roach to a rccogr±tion of the

doct--ine Df agency was in allowing the enforcement of' contracV
made by a servant of the beneficiary in his behalf or by some
other rerson not individually capable of entering into a
contract.

They held strictly to the rule thiat "per liberas

personas, quae in potestate nostra non sunt, acquiri nobis
nihil potest."?
upon the Roman,
had left it.

The English Law, based to a large extent
took ur the idea of agency where the latter
The common law judges at an early day recog-

nized and enforced rights acquired tharough agents,
doctrine of agency soon develo-ped into it-

and the

zoder'n extent and

significance.
Similarly, in the earilier stages of the law the
rights of an assignee of a contract vwe-e in no way recognized
in the courts.

The assignor was the only rarty entitled to

bring action; and if, having done so, he fraudulently approyriated the l-roceeCs to his own use,

or if

he refused to

bring action at all, the assignee had no rc-'icfy at law.
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Equity final

, iiter'yosed in

bohaif Df the assignee,

whenever

the assignor endeavored to tahe adva-tage of hiF helplessness,
but beyond this he nould obtain no relief.

Later, the courts

of law, implying that the assignor by the adt of assignment
gave tie assignee power to use his name in all necessary
legal

.roceedings,

so far recognized the rights of the assign-

ee as to allow him to bring action in the name of the assignor.
Again, in cases where money or croperty had been
deposited with one party by another to le paid over to a
third, the courts, after some controversy, allowed the person to whom the money v:' .s to be -aid t; maintain an action at
law against the depositary.

Such actions,

primarily out of contract relations, are

although arising

ot strictly actions

upo.i contract, from which they should be carefully distinguihed,

The money is not loaned to the -7efendant, but is

simply deposited with him to be paid over to another, no
relation of debtor and creritor being created.

The bene-

ficiary has a right to bring acti-n against the delinquent,
not upon an i.yrlied contract with him, but uzpon the theory of
a trust.

The action is eociit.ble in its nature.

Upon re-

ceiving money to be paid over to another, the dejositary as-
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sumes a duty to the beneficiary to faithfully execute the
trust, and it is this duty which forms the basis of the ac-

tion.
Notwithstanding these liberal tendencies, it has
always remained a general rule of law. that the 1.1aintiff in
an action on contract must be the person from whom the consideration of the

contract actually moved, and that a stran-

ger to the -onsideration can iave no right of action; or,
as it is sometimes expreqscd, in an action of assunpsit,
there must be a irivity of contract betv;een the
the defendant.

laintiff and

The courts, in allowing suit to be brought

upon contracts made by agents, in rermitting assignees to
bring action in the name of the asignor, or in enforcing the

rights of the beneficiary of a trust fund by an action at law,
have created no real exception to this gencral rule.

So

far as these classes of decisions have affected the rule at
all, they have merely defined and explained its true application.

zut some of the early English decisions went far-

ther and granted at least one real exception.

This exception

consisted in allowing a stranger to the considoration to sue
on a contract made for la:a

benefit, but to which $ne was not

_-z-

This right w~s allowied by some judges and denied by

a party.
others,

apparently without any att( e 1t

Watering between loyalty to :,ocedo: t on the one

decisions.
side,

to reconcile their

and a growir

enforcement

the

tendency tororC. Lreater libcrality in

of rights on the other,

te

courts laid down

numerous conflicting decisions and arrived at no defi.ite results.

A study of these early decisions might be interesting

as showing this struggle,

but would hardly be profitable.

Two cases, decided a few years apart will sufficiently illustrate the condition of the l:.
In

St? rey

vs.

,lII,

Style's Rep.,

2 96 (1651),

a-ppeared that a father gave certain goods to his son,
consideration that the son would -ay
action 20 pounds.

It

it

in

to the p-lainMtiff to the

was held that the Ilaintiff

could

maintain assulpsit on this promise although it was not made to
him.

"There is

a -:lain contract because the goods were

given for the benefit of the p1 intiff,
be not between him and the defendant;
an action upon the case,

for there iA

though the contract
and he may 'ell
a promise in

have

law made

to the plaintiff though there is not a promise in fact.
There is a debt here, and the assumpsit is good."

-C-

In Crow vs. Rogers, 1 Strange, 592, the plaintiff
declared in

one John Hardy was in-

assimmpsit that "wvhereas

70 pounds upon a discussion had be-

debted to the plaintiff

tween Hardy and the defendant

was agreed that the defendant

it

debt of 70 pounds and that Hia.dy should

should lay plaintiff's

The plaintiff averred

make defendant title to a house."
that Hardy was ready to j erfor,.
sumlsit could not be maintained,

was decided that as-

it

because there was no privity

between the parties to the action.
probable that,

at the time of these decisions,

the weight of authority -.as in

favor of allowing a third per-

It

is

son to sue on a contr'act made for his benefit.
During this formative period of the law, but one
point seems to have been definitely settled;
if

the beneficiary

promisee,

of the

namely,

that,

.,romise was a near relative of the
The

the former might maintain an action thereon.

leading authority in

support of this proposition is

ous case of Dutton and Wife vs.
cided about 1670.
of the plaintiff,

In
being

Poole,

this case it

1 Ventris,

the fam-

318,

de-

apeared that the father

seized of certain lands,

was about

to cut timber off them forthe purpose of raising a "portion"

-7-

The defendant, who had

for his daughter, the plaintiff.

a reversionary interest in the lands, yromised. the father
that, in consideration of his forbea-ing to fell the trees,
he (the defendant)

would pay the said dauvhter 1,000 pounds.

The King's Bench, after considerable discussion and several
re-iearings decided that the dauhter
maintain an action upon the promise,
the contract.

and her husband cpuld
although not parties to

In the qaint language of the Chief Justice,

"It might be another case if

the money had been to have been

paid to a stranger, but there it

such a nearness of relation

between the father and the child, and

t

is

a kind of debt to

the child to be provided for, that the -laintiff is plainly
concerned."
For nearly 200 years the authority of Dutton vs.
Poole, seems to have been practically undisputed.

Meanwhile

the courts', becoming more and more strict, had gradually
licjitcd the application of the rule that a stranger to the
consideration might enforce the contract made in his favor to
circumstances coming within the facts of that case.

And

finally, about 1860, the decision in Dutton vs, Poole was
expressly over-ruled by the case of Tvweddle vs.

AtL.inson,

-a-

1 B.&

S.,

393.

Aft.r statin: that t'.e action of assum;sit

was formerly treated as an action of tresyass on the case
and therefore in the nature :f

a tort action, Judge Crompton

thus disposes of the whole matter once for all:

"The modern

cases have in effect over-ruled the old decisions;

they show

that the consideration must move from the Tarty entitled to
sue ulon the contract.

It would be a monstrous proposition

to say that a person was a -arty to the contract d for the
purpose of suing upon it for his own advantage, and not a
party to it

for the rurrose of being sued."

This remark in-

dicates the present position of the English courts; and it
serves to illustrate

eo,,

as in many other instances,

the

conservatism of the English Bench has refused to recognize
a doctrcine which had met the aroval

of its

most eminent

judges.
In

this connection,

it

is

interesting to note that,

although Dutton vs. Poole w:as over-ruled and its doctrine repudiated,

it

was expressly approved in

Todd vs. ',ebber, 05 N.Y.,

131.

the recent case of

But the chief inportance of

that cease lies in the fact that in Ne. York it has indirectly
formed the basis of the broader princil le that, inderendent

-9-

a third yerson may sue wpon a contract

of near relationship,
made for his benefit.

The leading American authority in

support of the

yrorzsition that a third person may sue on a contract inten-

ded for his benefit is Lawrence vs. Fox, 20 N.Y., 268; and
the doctrine itself

Lawrence vs. Fox. "

-is

familiarly known as the "Rule of

I have thus outlined the course of the

decisions in England with a view to showing the influences
which were brought to bear urpon our own courts when the same
question arose here for a final determination; and as a
fitting introduction to a discussion of the -.
resent extent and

arplication of the doctrine of Laz:rence us. Fox.

LAWRENCE

VS.

FOX,- ITS

--------------

AUTEORITY AND. REASONING.

x---------

The essential facts of the case rof Lavrence vs. Fox,
were that one Holly at the request of the defendant,
the later $300,

loaned

at the same time stating that he owed that

sum to the yl4intiff Lawrence for borrowed money and had
agreed to ray it
in

to him the next day.

The defendant Fox,

consideration of receiving the said sum from 1iolly,

promised to pay a like amount to the plaintiff
Fox failed to -ay

according to his agreement,

the next day.
and Lawrence

brought this action uxpon the promise made by Fox to Holly.
A non-suit was asked uron the g-round,

among others,

there was no -rivity of contract between the plaintiff
the defendant.

that
and

The motion for a non-suit was denied, and

-ll-

judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed in the Court of Ajppeal.
Two Judges dissented, and three more, altllough concurring in
the result, 1.laced their decision upon the ground of agency.
The authority upon which the decision rests it at
least doubtful.

Judge Gray in the -revailing opinion states

that, as early as 1-06, it was ann-ounce1 by the Suprme Court,
upon what was then regarded as the settled law of England,
that "where one person -akes

a promise to another for the

benefit of a third person, that third person may maintain an
action upon it."

The rroposition just quoted is taken from

the opinion in Schermerhorn vs. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns.,

140,

in which opinion it is further stated that "this was the doctrine of the King's Bench in Dutton vs. Poole.,

From what h

has alnady been said, it is plain that Dutton vs. Poole, was
never authority for so broad a statement;

and, as Schermerhorn

vs. Vanderheyden, was decided upon a similar state of facts,
it a-plication also should be confined to cases in which the
promisee and the beneficiary are near relatives.

Moreover,

the statement in the latter case is pure dictum, for the decision went against the plaintiff upon other grounds.

With

the exception of Farley vs. Cleaveland, 4 Cowen, 432, all the
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other Ne,- York cases relied upon in the opin-io-l- in
the
in

sun.iort of

ri1rlt of action aru based upon this doctrine

laintiff's

Scherme-1horn vs.

these cases had

.,of

-......

done i.nch to stren
1 7,thcn the authority of this dictua, but it
is

the

doubtful if

In Farley vs.
aiitioity

'int

Cleveland,

up-on this

was roally in

issue in

a-,

of them.

which has often been said to be an

oint;

the promise was .:-are directly to

the plaintiff and the case was cited simply to show that the
oral promisc of Fox to fay the debt of 1 olly v;as not void under the Statute of Frauds.
Nor does the prevailing opinion indicate very
clearly the theory upon which the action was sustained.

"It

can be regarded at best but as an unsltisfactory though well
meant attempt to base upon

-_rinci:-ie what the judges felt

must be recognized as law."
place to examine at this -oInt

Therefore it

will -.ot be out of

some of the exy.latmt ions which

have been suggested in later cases.

The decision has been

usually explained either uiron the ground of a trust or of
agency,

it

is

evident that the action can not be sustained

upon the forMer theory for the sim-wie reason that there was
no trust created.

in fact, the idea of a trust is expressly
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repudiated in the opinion.

In cases in which similar actions

have been maintained upon the theory of a trust, no relation
of debtor and creditor has existed.

A fund received under

such circumstances does not become the property of the depositary, but must be specifically accounted for by hilf.
This equitable duty forms the basis of the action.

In the

case in question, Fox borrowed the money of Holly and it became his property.
created between them;

The relation of debtor and creditor was
and Fox, in satisfaction of that debt,

promised to pay $300 to Lawrence the next day.

If the action

can logically be sustained, it -.
ust be upon that promise.
The theory adopted by three of the judges, that the
promise could be considered as made to Lawrence through the
medium of his agent whose action he might ratify, would likewise furnish a:L

easy solution of all difficulties, if the

circumstances of the case did not plainly show that no agency
was intended

or even thought of.

Furtherore, our system

of jurisprudence has reached the stage in its progress where
it is no longer necessary to seek the aid of legal fictions
in order to justify any decision which fairness and equity demand.

Neither a trust or an agency was created, and we are

-14-

not required to imply the existence of either.

It has al-

so been said that, as there was a legal obligation existing
between the -erson to whom the promise was made and the one
who was to receive the benefit of it, the latter becomes so
connected with the transaction that a "privity by substitutio'
is created between him and the promisor.

This furnishes a

plausible exrlaination, but it is more ingenious than necessary.

There xvas no actual privity between the 'parties to

the action;

-and why should he be required to create one by

substitution?
At the close of the o-pinion it is stated that "No
one can doubt that he owes the sum of money demanded of hin,
or that in accordance with his promise it was his duty to
have paid it to the ylaintiff. "

Is not this duty, coupled

with an intention that Lavwrerce should hi-ve the right to enforce it, a sufficient basis ofor the action?

When any

person enters into a contract, he does so with the understanding that he must either perform it according to its terms
or become liable to an action.

The question who is to re-

ceive the benefit of rerformance, as well as the question who
is entitled to bring the action, delends alike upon the in-
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tention of the jarties to the cont-acf;
case,

and if,

the courts c3n say that a cont-act is
it

for the benefit of a thir: yerson,

in any given

intended

.rimarily

requires :.o greater

liberality of construction to say that the parties mutually
intend that such third herson should have tho right to enUsually a contract doe? rot in express terms in-

force it.

dicate who is

to sue in case of breach.

the class under discussion,

!I a contract of

be the intention of the

it -c

parties that the Iromisee alone shall be entitled to enforce
it,

or that only the beneficiary shall have that right, or

they may intend thsat either may bring action.

That they do

The right of action is

intend is a matter of construction.

conferred by law as an incident of all contracts; but the intention of the parties must determine who is to enforce that
right.After,
tion, tei

in a yarticular case,

aseertaining4

this inten-

courts have a logical basis upon which to sustain

an action without invoking the aid of a fictional trust or
agency,

and without implying a "privity by substitution."
Thit whether or not La7.v'-enco vs.

be fairly supported by authority,

it

is

Fox can be said to

sufficient for our

prpose that the doctrine there lair, down has been approved S-

-15-

and followed;

and although differences of opinion may ex-

ist as to the reasoning upon which the action in that case
should be supported,

one thing is

certain--the decision--was

rendered in accordance with the wide spread tendency in
American Law to allow greater liberality in the acquisition
and enforcement of contractual rights.

it is too late to

question either the reason or te law.

Assuming, therefore,

that the decision is sound both upon principle and authority,
I purpose to examine separately the different classes of
cases in which the doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox has been applied, with a view to determining its :resent influence and
extent in each.

But before considering the separate classes

of cases, it seems advisable to lay down the following general rules within which, as shown by subsequent authorities,
that doctrine may be ar.7lied; and, as all the requisites
prescribed in these rules were present in the case of Lawrence
vs.

Fox,

they may be regarded as re-resenting exactly what

was there decided.
I.
third

The contract containing

the -romise

to 1ay the

erson -Iust be supported by a consideration ai;d must

be free from fraud

or mistake.

-1'-

II.

The contract must be int(r.,dcd for the benefit of

the third person; that is, such benefit rmst be fairly w'ithin
the contemplation of tne' pxrties to the contract;

it

-s

not

sufficient that he may be inci-c,ntally benefited by its performance.
III.

There must be an existing relation between the

rromisee and the t'hird person, and some legal or equitable
duty owing from the former to the latter.
this requisite is not very apparent.

The reason for

Assuming that the

action is based aTon contract relations, it is difficult to
see upon what principle, if the promise is supported by a
sufficient consider.tion

-oving from

the promisee to the

promisor, any thing more should be required to render the crom
ise enforceable by the beneficiary.
IV.

The doctrine of La.:rence vs. Fox will not be ex-

tended to re T" or doubtful cases, but it1 apilication will
be limited to caseslhjving the same essential facts.

COVENANTS

It

is

BY

GRANTEES

OF

MJORTGAGED

........-

x ---------

an ordinary incident of real

PREMISES.

estate trans-

actions that in a conv.Teyance of mortgaged :roperty the grantee takes the -remises

subject to the lien of the mortgage and

as a rart of the consideration of the transfer covenants to
become personally liable for the payment of the mortgage
debt.

How far the mortgagee can take aav ntage of such an

agreement, and the ground upon which his right to do so resta,
are questions which have given risc to a great diversity of
opinion in this and other states.

in an action upon an

agreement of this nature the case of Lawrence vs.
first

applied,

and it

is

in

Fox vwas

this class of cases that the

doctrine there laid down has received its nost severe crit-

-18-

icismuas well as its

most frequent application.

The law has for a long time been well settles3 in
this state that the

rranted under such circumstDjncos becomes,
to the trancaction,

as between the jarties

the principal

and that the undertaking

debtor and the grantor his .lret

of the grantee to yay off the incumbrance is

a collateral

security acquircad by the nzortgagor for his indemnity.
this assumption,

Upon

the mortgagee wav: allowed to avail himself
in accordance with the 1-rinciple that a

of this agreement,

creditor is in equity entitled to become subrogated to the
benefit of any securities held by a surety for his indemnity.
Before the decision in

lawrence vs. Foxthis was regarded as

the only theory liroxi which the gr-Ttor could be compelled to
respond directly to the mortgagee for a deficiency arising
upon forclos're and sale.
24 N.Y.,

178,

the case of 3urr vs.

Beers,

a dlifferent viev was taken of agreements of

this nature and the
another groun.

But in

liability

of the grrantee vras placed upon

This was an action at law brought against

the graontce before foreclosure upon his covenant to assume
payment of the mortgage debt.

As no foreclosure was sought,

and as the mortgagor was not made a -arty,

the action clearly

-18-

could not be maintained upon the ,rinciple of the former
cases.

Accordingly, the court unani-ously concluded that

"if the judgment can be supported at all it must be upon
the brorI' prinlci-lo that if one person m .es a -romise to another for the benefit of a third- person, that third person may
maintain an action on the promise."

Upon this principle the

judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
this

A little later

decision met with the approval of the Commission of

Appeals in the case of Thorp vs. Keokuk Coal Co.,

48 N.Y., 25

Here the facts were substantially the same, except that in a
bond accompanying the mortgage, a clause had been inserted to
the effect -that recourse should first be had against the
mortgaged property and the obligors should only be liable for
the deficiency.

The action 7 as brought against the grantee

before foreclosure to recover the whole anount unpaid, and
was sust.ined.

The court, after spying t:,.t there ha

been

some diversity of opinion as to the Zround upon which the
liability of the grantee in such a case must rest, and that
it

had finally been

de id

that it

mi-ht rest upon the doc-

t-ine of Lawrence vs. Fox, makes this broad statement:-"The iefendant upon sufficient consideration acreed to pay

-20-

the amount of the mortgage debt to the plaintiff.

This he

agreed to do personally and absolutely, and nt upon the
condition that resort s'ould first be had to the land by
foreclosure of the mortgage.

It matters not that the mort-

gagor was not liable to pay personally until after foreclosure,
and that he was then liable only for a deficiency.

It would

make no difference if he had not been liable at all the defendant having p.romised upon a sufficient consideration to
pay the debt."
The rule thus broadly stated in Burr vs. Beers, and
reiterated in Thorp vs. Coal Co.,

has received two impottant

limitations:
(1.)

Where the grantee takes title to the premises by

an instrument in effect #mortgage

and not by an absolute

conveyance, his agreement to assume the payment of an existing
mortgage cannot be enforced by the prior mortgagee.
(2)

Where the grantee agrees to pay a debt for which the

g-antor was not Tersonally liable, the holder of the mortgage
debt cannot enforce such agreement againf st the grantee.
The first limitation w.as established by the case of
Garnsey vs. Rogers, 47 N.Y., 233.

The decision in this case

-21-

was handed down by, the Curt of Al:eals at about the saae time
that Thorr vs. KcchiX Coal Co.,

wars decided by the Conmmission

of A1-eals; and, while the

iis

ei

t'ioislves

are not nec-

ecsar~ly in conflict, the Cicta of the two courts show
vide difference of opinion.
were as follows:--

a

:e facts in Garnsey vs. Rogers,

A conveyance of mortgaged property, ab-

solute in form, had been nade by the mortgagor to the defendant, the latter acsLming pay ent of the mortgage debt.

This conveyance w s shown, however, to have been given upon
parol agreement for redemption by which it appeared that the
whole transaction was intended
therefore a mortgage.
oriinal

eyas

a security and was

Previous to the foreclosure of the

-::ortgage, the gr-ntec (roge-s)

ises to the mortUgaor by a deed in

"e-conveyed the premich the latter agreed to

re-ac-sume the payment of th e i-ortgage debt.

Uon these

facts the question arose whether Rogers, vho ha; for a time
held the land as security for a debt under a conveyance which
was really a mortgage, could be held personally liable upon
his covenant to pay the prior incumbrance.

It was decided

that case furnished no occasion for the a-.: lication of the
doctrine of equitable subrogation, as the grantee remained in

-22equity the owner of the land, and if any relation of rrincipal
and surety existed he was the :rincipal debtor ald would ultimately be obliged to yay the mortgage debt.

The court

also declined to hold the grantee liable upon the groumd of a
promise made for the benefit of the mortgagee for reasons
which are forctbly rtated by Judge Rapallo:-

"I do not under-

stand that the case of Lawrence vs. Fox has gone so far as to
hold that every promise made by one jerson to a:other from
the 7erformance of which a third would derive a benefit gives
a right of action to such third party, he being privy neither
to the contract nor the consideration.

To entitle him to an

action, the contract mist have been for his benefit.
must be the -arty intended to be benefite.

..

He

... But in

the present case the agreement was not to apply money which
the promisee delivered for t-e i urpose, or which was due him
from the

:-_omisor, to the use of a thir

party, but the prom-

isor engaged to advance his own money for the purpose of protecting the property Df the promisee, which advance when
made

.:ould become a lien on the propeety of the promisee.

Regarding the conveyance

as a mortgage, the stipulation was in

effect to advance to the promisee on the security of the

-23property, to discharge a prior lien,
benefit of the promisee only."

and was made for the

Itw will be observed that

the case in no way denies the right of a thir. Iperson to
sue on a promiso intended for his benefit; but simply decides
that under the ciroinistances the :romise was not so intended.
Upon this point, the decision in Ricard vs. Sanderson, 41 N.Y.
179, is apparently in conflict; but from thc insufficient report of that case it is difficult to determine exactly what
was there decided;

and Garnsey vs. Rogers, must be tahen

as

establishing the proposition that a promise made by a mortgagee to assume the rayment of a prior incumbrance is intended
solely for the benefit of the mortgagor and can be enforced
by him.
The second limitation above mentioned was stated as
the ground of the decision in Vrooman vs. Turner, 09 N.Y.,
280.

The action in this case was brought against the grantee

of mortgaged yremiscs, who had assumed payment of the mortgage
debt in the usual manner.

But it appeared that since the

premises had become incumbered, they had passed through the
hands of several intermediate holders, none of whom had
agreed to pay the mortgage;so that the grantor of the defen-
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-!ant was under no personal liability.

It had already been

decidcT unrdfe r a similar state of facts thai
could not be naintained UT-n the 7riliciic
subrolrtion bec-use no relation
istef (King vs. 1T-nitley,

such an action
of an equitable

of rpri'cijal

and surety ex-

10 Paige, 4C,);

and this c.e, al-

though distirr'uished and ayrrarently over-ruled in Thorp vs.
Coal Co.,

was here ex-ressly ay rcved.

concluded

that

th

defendant

the authority of La-rce
bounds wvere
vas

-rescrib7

vs.

could
fox,

The court

ot be h C0

liable

further
on

and the foliowing definite

vithin vhich the decision in

aTrlicable- "To givc a third rarty, w o

benefit from the performance, of the

that case

.ay derive a

-ro'nise an action, there

zust be first an intent by the :,romisee to secure some benefit to the t' ird yarty, and second some privity between the
two, the -romisce and the -erson

to be benefited and some ob-

ligation or duty owing from the former to the latter wuich
would

'ive him a leal or equitable claim to the benefit of

the 7romise, or an eriuivalent from him rersonally."
I have considered the above cases somewhat in detail for the reason that the

law on this

subject

as there de-

fined and aplied has remained substantiallyr unchanged.

There
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have been -numnr:us later decisions,

but av a rule they have

served merely to strengthen the lines drav.n by the earlier
cases.
The -eneral
been apliod in
Ken-1e1y,

rule,

Cm~nrbeli vs.

Snith,

26;

Hand vs.

134 N.Y.,

LirL,

has

-Leers,

Burr vs.

71 N.Y.,

and 'Viger vs.

1,10;

83 N.Y.,

as stated in

122.

The last mentioned case might easily have been s.,,r:orted upon
the theory of a- equitable subrogation,

but the court pre-

ferred to place the decision u~oL a broader ground of a contract made for the benefit of the Tlaintiff.in Duming vs.
Leavitt, 85 N.Y., 30, it was decided that a aortgagee could
not enforce a covenant, the consideration for which had failedwho had taken -ossession

The grantee,

a paraviount

had been evicted by one holdain

only question in

title;

.eed,

and the

issue wa.s whether this eviction constituted

a failure of consideration.
distinguished,

under a warranty

Thorp vs.

Acoh.uk Coal Co.,

was

but the 1-cneral doctrine of that and kindred

cases w-as not -enied.
"he

,o c

ora

cases following the limitation

established by garnsey vs. Rogers, are P r ee vs. Treat, 82
N.Y.,

385;

and Root vs.

7'right,

84 N.Y.,

72.

In the former
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the facts were the same as in Garnsey vs. Rogers, except that
the mortgaged -remises had not been redeemed from the grantee
before the action was commenced.

It will therefore be

seen that the doctrine of that case is huere somewhat extended.
The excertion to the general rule granted by Vrooman
vs. Turner, h-os met with uniform approval in
The most

the later cases.

imrortant is Ddrnhor vs. Rau, 135 NT.Y.,

219.

The

circu nstances under which this action was brought are somewhat peculiar, and deserve/, some attention.

it appears that

the rlaintiff's husband had held certain real-estates subject
to a mortgage in which the wife had joined.

He afterwards

sold the ,remises to the defendant who assumed to nay all
incurnbraQnces on the land "by mortgage or otherwise."

The

mortgage wvas aftervards foreclosed,

and

the Irorerty sold,

the plaintiff's inchoate right of dower in the equity of redemption cut off'.

This action was brought by the wife to

recover the value of her dower interest.

The court held

with mbnifest justice that the action could not be maintained.
"There is lacking in this case the relation of debtor and
creditor between the grantor and the third person seeking to
enforce such a covenant, or such a relation as makes the per-
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formance of the covenant at the instance of such third rerson
a satisfaclion of smc legal or equitable duty owing by the
grantor to such person which imust exist according to the
cases in order to entitle the stranger to the covenant to enforce it.,'
In Gifford vs. Carrigan, 117 N.Y., 257, it was decided that the covenant by ,-1hich the grantee assumed payment
of the inortgare debt,

after being acsentoe

to and adopted by

the .. rtgagee as a secJrity for his oc':;benefit,
votable,

and therefore a rclease ;y the gartor

was not rewithout the

assent of the :iort-age creditor did not disc--arge the grantee.
This de.cision, because of its -eneral aclicatimn, will be
more fully considered under the discussion as to the revocability of the promise.
'on

the foregoil-ig. examination of t ,e

authorities,

the following conclusions are reached as to the rresent application of the doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox to actions upon
covenants by gZant-es of n:rtgaged rrcmises to pay the mortgage debt,

assuming in

each case,

that such covenant is

based upon a sufficient consideration:-I.

The theory of equitable subrogation is

no longer a
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necessary -art

"Wfhen the 1

chancery,

a bromier equity,

the form and nature of'
One does not see'

ceases to be of consequence.

to trace the river arter it
II.

in

has absorbed,

the narrow one enforced in
the latter

actions of this -ature.

of the law in

has lost itself

A covenant contained in

in

the lahe."

an ;bsolute conveyance will

be rea-rded as made for the benefit of the mortgagee and may
be enforced by him to recover a deficiency - omain~llg after f
foreclosure ad sale,

and T-robably before foreclosure to redebt.
.rage

cover the whole amount of the .
III.
tually

A covenant contained in

a conveyarce Wh-ich Is

ac-

effect a nortgage will be regarded as intended

or in

solely for the benefit

,a
of the

tc

and c :.n be enforced

only by him.
IV.

If

the -rantor 7os not 1.ersonaily liable to -ay

rortgage debt,

the

the covenant cannot be enforced by the mort-

gagee.
V.

The covenant cannot be enforced by any one having

merely a collateral or contingent interest in the payment of
the mortgage debt.
VI.

The covenant, wzoen once accepted and acted upon by
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his consent.
the mortgage creditor cannot be revoked without

!CT~

1T

INCOLI1"M PARTNERS.

3

-9

The iiablt

-

-

-

x-------

of iicoir

rectly to creditors upo-l 'is

rartners to reaz,
ond di-

&..creontto assume payment of

the existinz debts of the firm is similar to that of a grantee
of mortgaged !remises,
action 1Tron suh

the
i right of a creditor to bring

romise de'ends i mon the s-.ae -rinci-les.

Here, as in the class of cases just ccnsidcred, the authorities are clea - that if

;fi.iso is i

of cred.itors it may be cnforced by them.

e etnded
for the

benefit

The difficulty has

been to dotoraine i7hetherin a particular case, the rromise
is so intended.
The first

attr: i-t

to a

iy thc !oct ine of Law-

rence vs. Fox in surport of actions upon rromises of this
nature led to an 'immediate conflict of o:i:Aons.

In

Clafln

-31-

vs.

Ostrom,54 N.Y., 58i,

lution of a y-artnershi!

it

that Aron the Iisso-

airered

oneof the 7-rtne f sold out his in-

terest to another who orally agreed tfirm debts,

asuiuae payment of the

among which was one due the -1aintiff.

fendant guaranteed2

the rerfor-lance of this agreement,

The deand it

was unanimously decider by the Co-inission of Arpeals that the
Tlaintiff could recover directly u'ron this guaranty.

The

dicision was rlaced _!Ion the groua that the promise to pay
the firm debts was intended for the benr fit
itors;

and that the guaranty,

of the firm cred-

being collateral to the main

promise "must go with the principal obligation and be enforced by the same persons who could enforce that."

At

about the same time, the decision in the case of Merril vs.
Green, 55 N.Y., 270, was handed down by the C;'iit of Appeals.
The facts wro r-racticaliy the same,

excert that the defendant,

Green as :rinciral and Nicholas as surety, had executel

to

the retiring rartners a joint and several bond conditioned
upon the

,ay

ent of the fichu debts;

and the action wias brought

by a creditor to recover ujron this bond.

The court held with

out dissent that the obligors on the bond were liable only to
the obligee named therein; that the agrreement of the defendant
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was made for the p-m.ose of exonerating the retiring partner
from his liability for the firm debts and was intended for
his benefit alone.
doubt

There can be little
oy iiionsthat

rrom the liguage of the

exactly opposite views were t 2ken of this class
Tattr cases have decided tbn+

of agrc ements.

he view taken

in Claflin vs. Ostrom, is the correct one, and that such agree
ments are intended for the benefit of the firm creditors (
(Barlow vs. Iflyers,
117).

If

04 N.Y., 41;

Ve regarK ,Lcil

Arnold vs. Nichols, 64 N.Y.,

vs; Green as deciding generally

that an agreerment by a yartrer continuing the firm business
to pay t he firm debts canrot be enforced by creditors---which
is

undoubtedly what the court ii',tended it

to decide---that

case must be considered as over-ruled by the later decisions.
But when rightly understooc- and confin *d to its

exact facts,

S0uoK0

the case of ..eril

vz.Green,

find4 adequate, both in previous

and in subsequent decisions; and the case is of sufficient
iTs1ortfDnce to merit a fey! rewiar-h-[s as to its
effect.
upon a p

The action,
...

it

will be remeffbered,

to ray the firm debts,

t'rue wosition and
was brought not

but upon a bond con-

ditioned to becomae void when such debts cere satistied.

-3'-

T',cre

>0os obligation excel t tat

and that

.as ex-frcssly to the

The

vrouli

.reditornir.'

dition in

no -roiise to ray thcm,

-f cour. e be

an'

method by which the ob1>or
penal in

Its nature.

been hold in Tur

[

vs.

ard for 'is

bl.ce

Jhe bond was :'erformed.;

the bond,

in

oU.,fl(J

" c -_

indemnity.

fittod when the con-

but tbe cohdition contained

was designed simrly tm

furnish a

an obligation
discharge
_-

Upon this reasoning,

it

ha-d already

Ri-s, 41 n.Y., 201, that a bond of a

similar nature vwas intended solely for the benefit of the
obli' ee and could be enforced only by him.

This case, al-

though not arising out of a rarte'ehir transaction, is
directly in -oint;
opinion.

but curiously ero'-'Ch vias not cited in the

Later, in Sirnson vs. Brown, 08 N.Y.,

355, in an

action against the garantor of a bond, Mocril vs. Green was followcd and the reasoningr of that ca.e aiclied ::ithin its
proper bounds.
T'e may, then,
in
7ill

Clafli-i vs.

be rega-eI

Ostuza,

state the general rule,

that the

as asserted

ronise to -ay the firm debts

as made for the b-ene"i

of the firm creditors

anC may be enforced by them; while _o'e-'l vs. Green, must be
considered as establiish'n

-

a Iiitaon to this general rule
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to the

-eet that

i-io:

the obli-Ition is

i1

thn

_'!orimof

a

bond conditioned iq!.on the pay-n.ent of the firm indebtedniess
it aan be enforced only by the oblie,e.
This general rule haF received one other limitation
of sor:e i :d.o-tance; namely, that if the agreement is made
generally to ,ay a certain :ortion of the firm debts, it can
not be enforced by any rarticula- creditor.

This was de-

cided in the case of Wheat vs. Fice, 07 N.Y., 200, in which
the question arose indirectly upon an agreement to pay
one-fourth of the indebtedness of the firm;
are thus stated in the opinion:

and the reasons

"No one, nor any specific and

identical creditor, could show in advance

of paylent that

the promise was intended for his benefit or covered any part
of his debt.

W1hether it 7 o1d benefit him or not depended

wholly upon the undisclosed option of the rlaintiff's dovn
to the moment at which they were required to pay one-quarter
of the indebtedness.

It would be a great extention of the

doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox to give a right of action to a
creditor for 'vbost

benefit the rromisc might or might not

have been mnrne.

To the same effect

107 N.Y., 260.

is Serviss vs. McDonalc

in Berry vs. Brown,
-inv

In the last mentioned case,
107 N.Y., 6E,9, therc

are statements indicating that, under

all cl ctmst-rnces, a

-r

reg~rfeC as ::adc o_>1" fr

th,,e

ecui:-ar a
i

.cat in

the
509,

c

thecicie,_._
'c sion
alth-'.

doctrine.
throT

o7C

-ro.isee.

Again

rt

it is said that, while
suc:
uc

as to raise

that the ncv: fIr3 h,. assmrcf the debts of
e fi.cts r-cre insuf iclent to show
la'iid s-: ort an action

a -ro-aic as

unzer the Aoct7ine of La --e .ce vc.

'-§:i~ich,

-i.2t
c'- wou3s be

c.m iances of that case

the old firm. yet the s
the existence of

; ioo:rv

the

Iyers, 135 N.Y.,

in Peyser vs.
the

.15e u:,

ox.

an . vs:. AL-

vot a very st-ong

t-,.e al,

a.... indicate a tendency to restrict

,

127

7.*.,

39,

--- e sustain-s the general

Whiile these d'icta are of

Q .-un

Oosed to these

i:.]!ortance to

if-iic:Lt

it_ of the ear!ler cases,
the'

aa

cat ion,

foll.in:i.ositIons , establsd-e bv the er,
lier cases,
are believed to-eent.the
Lao.- esm~t c-n. tion of the
I

A,- -,reementby::nczi_"t

y-rt :er

or )-7 a now

firm continuing the business after diissolution, of the old
fir-.d,

to -ay- all the fir-: indebteffis

or a s-ecified class

of creditors wil be re.ga-rcod as ma-e for the benefit of such

-~-,'

credito-r,- a:d
II.

-y

be enforcedJ! by tho2..

The doctrine of Lawronc

v7,

iertly e,:t, 'nc2 to sustain an action

'

Fox vrlil
:q.

be sui

c-

- iarx..,ty of such

an a:r'crc'r-ert.
ITn.

-cbtsc:-?
IV.

debteIness

A

r,

co i tion
i ed .7c -m -h(-

be eblfoc.
be

eo o-

t';c
L

A ,rovziso to hay a
vithodt sL ecifying

:--.t zf the firm
1 SCe

th--ei n.

e.tain -hortion of t-he firm in-"y rarticular

;7hts..canr.ot

be re-ared as nadec for the bene-it of a--.r o e cre- itor. -and
is

therefore enE1-ibio

jonlly

the
rro: see.

.7IIT.tT-HE,

CONTRACTS

TA?:.

A somev at anomalous arclication of the doctrine of
Lawrence v.

:'ox

has been -ade i: oases in which 7--ivate
who had en-

persons h-ave been injured by public cortractors

te-ed into a cznt-abt w ±th the state, and in consideration
of some benefit received therefrom haC agreed to pay ary
The

losses resulting fro ,: their negligence or -. iscofduct.
case of this nature,

first

relies to any 'remt
The MLayor,

4

NY.,

and in

'ron Lax:rcnce vs. Fox is

extent
399.

fact the only one which

Here it

a: eared that,

Coster vs.

by a special

act of the Legislature the City of Albany had been authorized
to na
In

certain i:7rovelnent-

v:ithin the

....

accord'ancc with tho provisionis of this act,

ed into an agreement unde- seal by Whic> it

1
li

.s.

the city enter-

areed to assLuao

and pay all clai-.1s for

e

ca1se,

to :roortl7 b

of the Mahing :f such ir.rovements.
to the

-

A blil-iri- belonging

laintiff h;.ving bcorn undermined,

action was

against the city niyon this agreement with the state.
hcl& that the w it

of *!rivity bcteoe:

reason

.

-brought
It

was

the ! arties ,v.s ;-o de-

fense to the ac.t ion, the courts saying that "In this case the
city agreed to z;ay all damages caused tor
all liability therefor.

r

an

assume

This was a -romise made to the

state for the benefit of any third rerson to whom property
f'amage

.a-

causow7.

1,Tor is

which the city assinues is

it

a -: anomaly that the liability

not in existence at the date of its

obligation, nor that the rerson .1ho is
is

4ot

to be beneFitted by it

then klnown."

Vfrrile a contract of this h in

can reasonably be

s.id to be inteded for the benfit of any person who may bo
injured by the ne21igence of the -romisor, it is difficult to
find any -rivity
benefitted,

betv~oe> the

-- roisee an

the " rson, to be

and any legal duty ovwi.ng frorm the former to the

latter,~hich.
surrort of T-uc-

w~ in- the rathoritie-, 'are es-cntial to the
an action.

exist,_ they are certainry r

If

such

-vit"r and legal duty

er- indefinite w.i

intangible
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t-ino of Lawo:-e vs.
of th-is cl.ss,

an action

_

t:;e

l

-7

. be si-orte
contra
.f

i-l -i O

inflicting the injury.

o'id seo

to bo that suoh

-

that,

ir-

an action for negll-

ftins,

avor of the

i

t"t'

:rron the broader -cud

-

of actions

'1 .ort

tT

7ho better or ion

ect ivc

L'-tK3c

oex can 0e a-lio: in

as <hethe_

is neCess-ry.

rpe

not so ;lch whethor the soc-

3ut the quesFtion is

relations.

arty iau

(Sec Robincon vs.

,

ainst the party

Chamberlain,

34

N.Y., 389).
Upon this --rinci-le, seems to rest the true expla-

-7a-Izs, G,
C1.Y., 25---

nc.tion bf the later case of Little vT.
a case which,

if

sustined as an action on contract, would

furnish a strihing

illustraLion of what a corMon law Judge

once termed "an offer of assu:wsit to all the world."

The

defendants in this case had entere,. into a contract with the
state to fuIr.is

bound volum.es of t
o_

Reports to all ia:-bo§:-scicr

ouart Of A-coals'

at

-a

se0ified -.rIce; and it

was further aireed that for eac'h failure to furnish such books

accord"ing t2 the terms :f the cotract,
the Terso,
auffered by

a~grieved the six-,
-

in,

of

they vo:il.

3 a.ated..

the smC to be i'ie.

forfeit to
amags

for a.,< recoTCcd by

-40-

This action was brought uron a failure of the

such -erson.

-lai-:tiffs as required by

to furnish boots to the

defendi..nts

At General T'

the contct.

:,

a judgment for the Ylaintiffs

was sustained. a-armntly 'ipon the doctrine of Lawrence vs.
rox

In

the Court of Appeals, this jitd-ment was affirmed,

in-nece:7cary to reso~t
,o; iw-,-,o it
but t-lo court eviLdenftl'
-Icsion is
T'h basis of the
to the Ioct'-ine of -'t.D.t ca.c.
thus statedl

in

the orinion:-

"Contrators with the state, who

assure, for a consideration -eceive2
rower, by covenant excress or !

clo
do

olect to
aro.liabie in case of -.
-ivate

,_-rer

action at the suit of the

ero

:arty

the sovereign

o

cotain things,
such covnant, to a

injured 1, such'o-

slect, and such cont._act inures to the benefit of the indiAfter citing
o is inte--estc& i, it nforaic.
vi-ual -.nunerous cases in

surrort of this --torosition,

are 1-Zl ience cases,

the o-inio-, :rocec, s

"The gr ound uron

-clecisions are foundec is a broad
.rc
ublic i' ..
ublic r~o!icy essential to the --

which thesc

able to 7,-c ceivo
the rule laid downm

;why the <octrine last statocd
in

L.:r , .. c'

v-.

7on,

is

all of which

.i-iiie_

of

We
,,

not

un-

i ithout invok-ing
. iicablc to

a contract of thle f.oscrip_ tion o,_ the one in controversy."
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7hile the mingling of statute authority,

and tort 1iability renders the matte'

co-tract obligation,

somev.hat uncertain,

the logical inference to be drawn from this la-.guage is that
negligence forms the underlying :-rinci-ie Lu.-cn w ich the
action is basc<.
iu:o

A

murin,-,

then,

that

thic:

v-ich actions of this :;aturc are r-orly

follows that there is

tis the theory
su::orted, it

no occasion for the a!Jlication of

the narrower doctrine of Lawrence vs.

Fox.

1?I1OR

It

APPLICATIONS.

has boon decided that a contract of ro-ihsurance

in which the re-insure-

expressly a-roes to -.ay policy holders

may be enforced by a Tolicy '.older upon the principle of a
cont,-act made for his benefit (Glen vs.
A rccent case of considerale
:-oint is

Yfisc vs.

without orinion,
certain life

T7organ,

103 N.Y. , 402.

a controlling interet

56 N.Y., 379

iL*ort nce beering upon this

13 Daly,

Insurance Company,

Ins.Co.,

682;

s.c.,

Here it

affirmed

appearod that a

in consideration of obtaining

in another,

ac-oed that the contract

obligations existing betvceen the latter
comrfany and its

rolicy

holders sh -ld be fulfilled to the come eztcnt and in the same
manner as if
taken place.

no change in

the Management

of the comlrpjny had -

Defendant and others -uaranteed the rcrformance

-43of this agreement.

Sometime afterwards,

th o comrany having

become insulvent, this action was brought u!ron the guaranty
by a rolicy holder to reco-cr the a .ort due upon his policy.
It was held that the action could not be maintained; that the
guaranty signed by the dofendant amounted to nothing more
than an assurance that theo new cornpany which was thereafter
to conduct the affairs of the old comlpany would recognize and
fulfil

all pre-existing contract obligations,

and did not

bind him absolutely,under all circiustances, to pay all the
policy holders of the old co,.-zany.
wa.s simp.ly to fulfil
extent and in
had been made;

The agreement guaranteed

the company's contracts

the same manner"

as if

"to the same

no change in

and all that the caze doci es is

its

that

control
,nder

such a contract there xvoas no absolute .:romise to iay policy
What the ceoision would have been in

holders.

an ordinary contract of ro-iusurance is

an action upon

not indicated;

but,

although, owing to the absence of later decisions, the law
cannot be stated with certainty, there seems to be no reason
why, if the doctrine of Lav,,rence vs. Fox, is to be aplied
at all,

it

should ;mot be a-1rlie7 to atreements of this nature.
Then a leasehold interest is asgigned, the assignee
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of the lease becomes liable to ray rent to the original
lessor upon the rrivity of estatc c-reatcdcr bctveen thn;

&

there

ois,
of course, no occasion for the aj1:yiCat-on of £-fny

othr

ro,'nd of liability.

letting, or where,
lessee

to ac-siuine

But where there is :nly 'a sub-

for an'y -cason,

..rc.ci:cr.t iwith the

the

osF-ession of t

riscs

ther

tooy

.:o.nrt ilnlaw to an ass i_7nnt, there is

the lessor does rot

some inalication that the lessor mi-'it -DLintain an action lqron
such areement withir the r-incirle of Law..

,

vz. Fox.

In

an early .ass. case, Brewer vs. Dyer, 7 Cushing, 337, the
defendant gave to the lessee
take the lease an;, -ay
cording to its terms.

of a sho

a written rromise to

to the lessor the rent an, taxes acAItho

. the
. agreement was not exe-

cuted wIith sufficient formality to constitute an assi--ent,
the defendant waLs held liable to the !ester
subsequ...tly accruin1
38 N.Y., 346--354,

rent.

?ho ca-e of Vangcheih vs. R.R.Co.

contains a dictum which itimates that

such an action oizht..
be *aintalned.
122 N.Y. , 40 ,

or taxes and

the conrt co;:sider; the

the action were brought by the le--Dr;

In Lorriad vs. Clyde,
eti-

as thoug.

ut the only issue was

whethor a stipulation coutainei i,1 an a rcoon:ent to form a
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corroration,

to the Offect that the eorroraticn when formed

would assume a certain lea-e,

could be reg-arde7 as made for

the benefit of the lessee who
vT,,.
While the matter is

not a Tyarty to the agreement.

not of much :ractical

suggested that the doctrine of Lawrence vs.

urortancc,
Fox,

it

is

might rea-

sonably be a:ilied to an agreement by a sublessee to :;ay rent
directly to the lessor,
amounting to a_-

or to any siuiilar a--Areement4 not

valid assi-r.nent#.

V here t-ansfers of' real or rer!:o-1al property
are
made

ubjc.t to the

debts or the

.

by the transferee of certain

e-formance of certain obligations binding u:on

the transferor, the former becomes liable to the rersons
entitled to the benefit of such paynent or rerformanco (Dingledein vc.

100 N.Y.,

.R.Co.,
6130).

S7 IT.Y.,
The liability

57 ;

lvs.

of the transferee is

agous to that of a -rantee assuming 'aynent
debt;

and the agreement falls

anal-

of a ritgage

easily within the -rinci-!ec

of a promise made for the benefit of a third person.

In

the forgoing examination of the authorities,

I :-ve collated all tho

-ie:
Yorh cases of i .r-o-tance in which

-4C-_

The doctrine of L;:,rC.ACC vs. FOx ha'
criticiscd.

eeO- - : l-c,

:.:y intention has been, v:it

any extent the justice or visd;.m of the a

t

li-ed1 or

iscssing to
clication,

to

reach conclusions as to the -resent confition of the law in

each class of oases.

The d'Lrislo-_I t3 classes has "bcen

made for the sa ze of convenience a d clearness and not because of any difference of

i

them.

FiniT.ally,

it should be remembere-. that, whilei11n soue instances the law
may be considered as definItely settled; in others, whereAm
there are fce'; recent

I2eisions, the conclusions reached in

each class rast be taken tith the cauti-

t_
hat the :Dresent

tendency of the courts is a-ainst the ;xplication of the doctrine.

REVOCATIION OF. '1Ti7 PR0iE.

x

-

-

-

-

There remains one question of i 'iortance to be considered, and that is whether the promise, from the perf'ormance
of which the third -erson is to receive a benefit,can

be rev

revoked without his consent by an agreement between the -arties to the contract.

It is .rcll settled in

this state that

after the Iromise has been assented, to a.d adoyted

by the

third rerson for his benefit, it is not revocable, and that a
re-leave by the rronisee ,.ithout the consenCt of the third
person does not -lischarge the :rcmsor (Gifford vs. Corrigan,
117 N.Y., 257).

in this case. as in neo rly all the others

in which the question has been considcred, the action was
brouhIt by a mortgagee against a -

ntee vPo had ass...ed
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payment of the mortgage debt.

The ro-lease,

after the action had been com-.crced,
The decision is based -vcon the
if

hich ;as
-.
given

held ineffectual.

,'z

-round that the mortgagee,

he car. sue at all, must at some ti-. e have a vested right
If

of action.

it

did note exist cariler, it

vested in him the moment the action coanenced.
there is

any "especial magic in

act of b-ringing it

3

la7,2 suit",

:ust have
Not that

blut beause the

shons unuequivocally that the third

person

has eacepted the promise and intends to enforce it for his
own benefit
before,

In other Wors,

.

ceases to be so when it

the contract, if revocable
comes to the h:nowledge of

the beneficiary and is accepted and acted upon by him.
MThile there are numnerous conflicting dicta upon the
subject,

the question w:hether the thi-

defeasible before he has acce- te
passed upon
rison, 24 N.Y.,

the

oerson's rights are
-- o--ois-e has never been

the Court of A-eals.
170,

it

vs

sa-id t-at

In

Hartley vs.

ilar-

the 1g-antor could not

upon any princinple release the g.rantec
was under to the plaintiff

in

he

conseqienne

of his taking a

conveyance of the premises subject to the -aymcnt of the mortgage.

His liability

to the --laintiff

as fixed the moment
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and it was -not in

he received the conveyance,

of the grantor to release him from it.'

Again,

the -ower o
in Garnsey

vs. Rogers, which is probablythe bet considered case upon
the general subject, the court, in distinguishing between the
effect of a cov-nai;t contained in

ar. absolute deed and in

a

mortgage, said that in the former case the agreement was, -"unconditional and irrevocable, the grintor cannot retract his
conveyance or the grantee his proraise."

But in Kelloy vs.

Roberts, 40 N.Y., 932, and in many later decisions there are
equally strong .d.icta 'o the effect that the promise before it
is accqpt by the beneficiari

is revocable;

and the court in

A

Gifford vs.

Corrigan, while expressly leaving the question

open, seems to favor this view.
The S'roe Court decisions show a similar conflict
of opinion.

For instance, in Stephens vs. Casbacker, 8 Hun,

116, the court decided that the promise 'mas revocable; while
in Douglass vs. 71ells, 13 Hun,

58, this case was disapproved,

and it was held that the liability of promiser wi s absolute
and that the beneficiary haf a vested right of action as senn
as the promise was made.
The position ta.en in

the latter

case see--s to be

more in accordance with the sone-al doctrine of La;:rnce vs.
Fox.

if, as

75s

said in Vroomarn vs. Turrner, the relation ex-

isting between the third person and the promisee so connects
as to create a "pri\ity

the former with the tr-ansactiom

Uy

substitution between him and the promisor, this so-called
privity must come into existence as soon as the contract is
made.

It follows from this that the third person becomes

virtually a -arty to the contract,
vestcd ;:ith a right of action
out -Is consent.
of the agreomcnt
If

aDX

must at once beco--e

.hic> can,,iot be tahen away with-

The right to sue is vested in him by force
itself (Seo Ba.y

J.1'lams,

11

Ill.,

91

the acceptance of the rromisc by the third5 per-son ean in

any way aid the vesting of this right,

such assent ought,

in

the absence of proof of actual disse:t,to be a le-al presumiption.

Of course,

it

is

a curious rroposition to saj that two

persons may"be competent to make a contract and -not be competent to alter or rescind it at their pleasure.

But it

must be remembered that the liability itself is exceptional;
and it

is

just as difficult to see upon what principle,

if

a cause of action has once been created in favor of one person,

it

may be discharged by another without his consent.
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However this may be, the dicta of the later cases, together
with the -resent tendency to restrict the ajoplication of Lawrence vs.

indicates,that,

Box,

the Court of Appels,
it

is

adoptec

I

whenl the question comes before

the yromise will be >cld revocable until

the -erson for whoso bencftit it

is

made.

